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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
I.

Nature 0f the

case.

This appeal asks Whether the

trial

court properly applied the law 0f tortious interference

with contract and conspiracy in ﬁnding Appellant Todd Brinkmeyer (Brinkmeyer) liable for

m

those claims. In September 2016, Brinkmeyer partnered With Appellant John Stockton
(Stockton) t0 purchase property from Appellant Estate 0f Francis Elaine

M)

Warren

located at the south end 0f Priest Lake, near Coolin, Idaho. Stockton

ﬁrst refusal

0n the property. While not

the property, the

in writing, before Stockton

Warren Estate represented

enforceable and superior t0

all

that Stockton’s right

(the

owned

a right of

and Brinkmeyer agreed

t0

buy

0f ﬁrst refusal was valid and

other prospective purchasers.

That included Respondent Tricore Investments,

LLC

(Tricore). In

June 2016, the Warren

Estate agreed t0 sell the property t0 Tricore pursuant to a purchase and sale agreement (the

by August, Tricore was attempting

Tricore PSA). But

t0 renegotiate the Tricore

signiﬁcant reductions in price and other concessions. John Finney
attorney, negotiated With Tricore throughout August.

(My), the Warren Estate’s

Based 0n Tricore’s representations and

negotiating tactics, Finney believed Tricore had repudiated the Tricore

negotiating a

new

Around

agreement.

the

He

felt

the

Warren Estate was

same time, Stockton learned

and Brinkmeyer are neighbors. They agreed

would afford them. Not knowing what

Estate.

At

the meeting, the

1022263 60.8 0076747—00001

still

that the property

t0 partner t0 see

refusal

PSA, seeking

t0 expect, they

PSA and the parties were

ﬁshing for a buyer.

might be developed. Stockton

What Stockton’s

right

met with Finney and

0f ﬁrst
the

Warren

Warren Estate disclosed the existence of the Tricore PSA. Finney,

PSA was n0

however, purposely withheld his belief that the Tricore

wanted Stockton and Brinkmeyer
feared they

would not buy

it.

to believe Tricore

That

is

was buying

when the Warren

longer enforceable.

the property, otherwise he

acknowledged

Estate

He

that Stockton’s right

of ﬁrst refusal was valid and enforceable and superior to any right Tricore had to the property.

Based 0n those representations, Stockton and Brinkmeyer agreed
After a court

the trial court held that Stockton and

trial,

with the Tricore PSA, causing
contract.

its

was unenforceable.

It

that Stockton

contract.

trial

Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered

Warren Estate

t0

breach the

court failed to properly apply the law

ﬁnding Stockton’s

civil conspiracy. It erred in

right of ﬁrst refusal

erred in ﬁnding that Stockton and Brinkmeyer intentionally and

improperly interfered With the Tricore PSA, causing

ﬁnding

purchase the property.

breach, and also conspired with the

Those rulings must be reversed because the

0f tortious interference and

t0

its

breach, Without justiﬁcation.

and Brinkmeyer could conspire with the Warren Estate

The judgment

against Brinkmeyer

t0

It

breach

erred in

its

own

must be reversed.

Statement of facts and course 0f proceedings.

II.

The

A.

1.

Priest

Lake property and Stockton’s

The Warren Estate owned property

For generations the Warren family owned land
Tr. at

right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

at the

at the south

end 0f Priest Lake.

south end 0f Priest Lake. R. 1994;

460220-461 :15 (Chris).1 The family’s land included undeveloped lake frontage and wetland

1

The

prepared three electronic volumes. One volume includes the
“R.”
The second volume includes the trial exhibits, plus the
as

district court clerk

clerk’s record,

which we

cite

We cite t0 the exhibits as “Ex,” followed by the “COE” page Cite. The
third volume includes the Reporter’s Transcript. We cite t0 the trial transcripts as “Tr.” followed
Certiﬁcate of Exhibits.

by

the witness’ name. Transcripts from motion hearings are cited as “Tr.” with the hearing date.
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property,

EX. 249

shown

(COE

as Parcels A, B,

W

441).

(m) had died in

and

When the

C 0n the map below.

WMPARIM EETAIEEXHIFH
MWMﬂn-‘l’i

events here arose, the

1993, and his wife Elaine Warren

Warren Estate owned the

(M) died

(ﬂ),

In 1990, the Warrens granted Stockton an oral right 0f ﬁrst refusal on
future sales 0f their property.

The Warrens, Stockton, and Brinkmeyer
as the “Warren’s

and Elaine

in

(M) and Dan

serve as co-personal representatives. R. 1995.

2.

known

Warren

in 2003. R. 1995; Tr. 66:23—25,

9623-5 (Dan). Elaine’s estate remains open, and their sons, Chris Warren

Warren

land. Bill

Beach Lots”

in Parcel C.

1988 and built a home. R. 1994;

owning parcels

in

an area

Brinkmeyer’s family purchased a

lot

from

643:2-22 (Brinkmeyer). Not long

after, in

are neighbors, each

Tr.

Bill

1989, Stockton purchased the lot next t0 the Brinkmeyers. See R. 1994-95.

Before Stockton closed on his

from the Warrens — land
706: 17 (Brinkmeyer).

line t0

was

Brinkmeyer’s mother offered to buy additional land

part 0f Stockton’s

lot.

See R. 1994-95; Tr. 643:13-22, 705:21-

The Warrens approached Stockton, and he agreed

accommodate a

1022263 60.8 0076747—00001

that

lot,

to

move

his property

sale t0 the Brinkmeyers. R. 1994-95; Tr. 56822-13, 56927-17 (Stockton).

In exchange, the Warrens gave Stockton a right 0f ﬁrst refusal should they sell additional

property along Priest Lake. R. 1995; Tr. 56822-13, 56927-17 (Stockton); Tr. 705:21-706:17

(Brinkmeyer); Ex. 8

(COE

106).

Stockton’s right of ﬁrst refusal was not reduced to writing, but
the Warrens, the

Tr.

Warren

(COE

106). After Bill

was never disputed by

56927-5703, 570:21-572:1 (Stockton);

Estate, or Stockton. R. 1995; Tr.

1562:7-1564:5 (Finney); EX. 8

it

and Elaine’s deaths, Stockton discussed

the right 0f ﬁrst refusal With Chris and his Wife almost yearly. Tr. at 570221-571 :20 (Stockton).

Brinkmeyer,

owned

who

inherited his family’s Priest

Lake house

in 2005, also understood that Stockton

a right 0f ﬁrst refusal. Tr. 646: 1 6-647: 10, 665: 1 6—666: 12, 68 1

(Brinkmeyer). For years,

it

:

1

0—19; Tr. 705:2 1 -707: 10

had been a topic of discussion between Brinkmeyer and Stockton and

the Warrens. Tr. 665:23-666:12, 707:17-22 (Brinkmeyer).

After offering t0

3.

sell

Estate listed Parcel

Finney was Elaine’s attorney, and

some of their property

B

t0 Stockton, the

Warren

for sale.

after her death,

he represented the Warren Estate. R.

1995; Tr. 98:9-23 (Dan); Tr. at 475:8—12, 488125-489211 (Chris); Tr. 787:14-78828 (Finney).

Finney handled

all

aspects of the estate, and Chris and

Dan trust him

absolutely. R. 1995; Tr.

98224-101 :4 (Dan); Tr. 48825-48921, 490:18-491 :1 (Chris). That included dealing with the
estate’s Priest

Lake property.

In 2014, the estate

Tr. 74: 19-25, 99:

owed back taxes on the

12-24 (Dan); Tr. 490:18-491

:18,

49328-23 (Chris).

property, and with Finney’s help, Chris and

Dan

obtained a loan t0 pay them. Tr. 714: 10-715: 14 (Finney); see also R. 1995.

The loan became due

1022263 60.8 0076747—00001

in 2015,

and

t0 repay

it,

the

Warren Estate decided

to sell

some 0f

its

Lake property.

Priest

Tr. 67: 12-68: 12 (Dan); Tr. 7 1524-71622 (Finney).

Stockton t0 determine his

R. 1995-96; EX. 11

interest.

Finney explained that Dan wanted
they were willing t0

(COE

to

(COE

112-13). In a

Finney contacted

May 2014

email,

A and Chris wanted to keep Parcel C, although

keep Parcel

portions of the parcels if they could retain the waterfront pieces. EX. 11

sell

113). That left Parcel

B

(~45 acres) and Elaine’s house parcel (~1.29 acres).

Id.

Finney

assessed the parcels together and the house at approximately $5,200,000. Id.

Understanding that t0 be the offer — Parcel

and Elaine’s house parcel for $5,200,000 —

B

Stockton declined. Tr. 552:3-553:12 (Stockton); see also Tr. 788:9-789:12 (Finney). The next
year, Finney informed Stockton that the

made n0

offer to

sell.

(COE

EX. 13

Warren Estate planned

(M),
58).

At

(COE

119); Tr. 617:18-618:1 (Brinkmeyer).

August 2015, the Warren Estate retained a
to list “Parcel

B

some of its property but

118); Tr. 553217-25 (Stockton); Tr. 789218-79029 (Finney).

Finney also informed Brinkmeyer. EX. 14
In

to list

local real estate agent,

Teague Mullen

approx. 44.9 acres” for sale for $2 million. R. 1995; EX. 201

that time, only Parcel

B was

listed for sale.

See EX. 201

(COE

(COE

53-

53); Tr. 378:8-379z7,

382:16-383:4 (Mullen); Tr. 716:10-21 (Finney). The representation agreement excluded a
brokerage fee for Stockton 0r Brinkmeyer as purchasers. R. 1995; EX. 201
B.

The Warren
In

1.

is

November 2015,

a development

114: 19-21 (Mort).

Mullen

Mort was

the

Warren

but that deal

fell

company owed by

interested in the

1

Estate agreed t0

Clifford

:

sell

Parcels

B and C

through.

Warren

t0 act as Tricore’s real estate agent. Tr. 15

1022263 60.8 0076747—00001

52).

Estate’s dealings with Tricore.

t0 Tricore,

Tricore

(COE

Mort (Mort) and

Estate’s Priest

his Wife. Tr.

Lake property, and he hired

13-17, 153:2-13 (Mort). In October 2015,

Tricore offered an agreement to purchase Parcel

77).

Mort foresaw ﬁlling

(Mort).

in

some 0f the wetlands

The following month,

“Addendum #1.”

By this

map produced.

Warren

for

$2 million. R. 1996; Ex. 202

t0 build waterfront

Warren Estate made a counteroffer

the

R. 1996; Ex. 203

time, the

B

Estate’s Priest

67); Tr. 825: 13-827: 10 (Finney).

remained the same, Parcel

B was

split into

two

and E,

as depicted below.

C was

split into

Parcels

D

17319-19

document labeled

Lake property had been resurveyed and a new

(COE

Parcel

in a

Tr.

271-

(COE 278-83).

Ex. 36

plat

homes.

(COE

all

parcels,

now

While Parcel A’s boundaries

laid out as Parcels

B

and C, and

mm W5
mmm
Ruwam
mum

M3
mun.

WARREN PARTIAL ESTA TE

Ex. 36

(COE

(together,

67).

~45

Addendum #1

offered t0 sell Tricore newly designated Parcels

acres) for $2 million. Ex.

871 :5 (Finney). Before making

'

its

203 (COE 283); see also Ex. 213

counteroffer, the

Warren Estate did not

(COE

B

and

C

341); Tr. 870:3:-

offer Stockton the

option t0 purchase that propelty on those terms. See Tr. 790: 10-1 5 (Finney).
In

November 2015, Mort signed Addendum #1.
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R. 1996—97; Ex. 204

(COE

284-96). But

by January 2016, Addendum #1 had terminated. Tricore had 45 days

0f

t0 study the feasibility

developing the property and an option t0 extend that period for non-refundable earnest money. R.
1996-97; Ex. 204

(COE

285). Tricore asked the

Warren Estate

to extend the period without the

payment. Tr. 216:1 1-20 (Mort). The Warren Estate refused, and the deal died. R. 1997.
In June 2016, the

2.

Warren

Estate agreed t0

sell

C

t0

more time

t0

Parcels A, B, and

Tricore.
Tricore immediately began renegotiating a potential purchase that included

explore the feasibility 0f developing the property. Tr. 150:13—20, 15 1 :8—17 (Mort); Tr. 1541

1542:4 (Finney); EX. 206

(COE

frontage than just Parcels

B

312-13); EX. 16

and C. R. 1997;

(COE

Mort

120-22).

Tr. 15 1 :18-152:4 (Mort).

also

:

1

8-

wanted more lake

Mort engaged attorney

Charles Lempesis (Lempesis) t0 help with the negotiations. R. 1997; Tr. 152:18—153:13 (Mort).
Eventually, 0n June 30, 2016, the

1997; EX. 29

(COE

Addendum #1

60).

Addendum #2

(together, the Tricore

Warren Estate and Tricore agreed

incorporated and

modiﬁed

PSA). R. 1997; EX. 213

extended feasibility until July 3 1. R. 1998; EX. 213

at

1]

Addendum #2.

329-45).

6.b).

The Tricore

0n September

9,

but

The Tricore

it

could be extended until October

PSA also

at

1]

3).

t0 sell

The portion of Parcel
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most 0f Parcel

11

6.b).

A (~23

to the sale.

money

Closing was scheduled

R. 1998; EX. 213

added more waterfront property

and C, the Warren Estate agreed
342-44

7.

at

PSA

Tricore could terminate

the agreement Within that period Without penalty, and if it did not, a $20,000 earnest

payment would be non-refundable. R. 1998; EX. 213 (COE 344

R.

the earlier agreement and

(COE

(COE 344

to

(COE 344

at

11

6.c).

Along with Parcels

acres). R. 1997; EX.

213

B

(COE

A that was not included was one 0r two parcels 0f “not less

than 200 feet 0f waterfront”:

and retain from Parcel A and Buyer shall create in compliance
with Bonner County Planning and Zoning provisions and approval, a parcel(s) in
size not less than 200 feet of waterfront (0r two 100 foot parcels — consistent with
Buyer’s development) adjacent to Tax 31 between the existing access road and

The

Sellers reserve

the lake.

EX. 213

(COE 344

at

1]

5).

That was the extent 0f the property description 0f the Warren Estate’s

reservation. Altogether, the

Lake property

Warren Estate agreed

for $2.4 million. R. 1997; EX.

213

t0 sell approximately

(COE 344

at

1]

65 acres of its Priest

4).

Before entering into the Tricore PSA, the Warren Estate did not offer Stockton the option
to purchase Parcels

A, B, and

C 0n those terms.

575: 19 (Stockton); see also EX. 8

3.

(COE

Tr.

790:10—15 (Finney); Tr. 55321-4, 574225-

106).

In August 2016, Tricore tried to renegotiate its purchase 0f the
property t0 include additional lake frontage 0r a lower price.

Tricore did not terminate the Tricore

money payment became
time,

See

PSA by July 3 1

,

2016, and

its

$20,000 earnest

non-refundable. R. 1999; Tr. 167: 1-168: 12 (Mort).

Around

the

same

Mort discovered he was mistaken about the amount of waterfront property Tricore had

agreed to purchase. R. 1998; Tr. 183:6-185z22, 222: 14-17 (Mort). Mort’s mistake
illustrated

by

the property

map

introduced as EX. 249

Mort believed Tricore was under
marks “1” and “2,” minus the “not

Warren

(COE

441), included

contract to purchase

less than

200

feet

all

of waterfront” in Parcel

lake frontage between marks “3” and “2”

1022263 60.8 0076747—00001

:

— that

is

best

0n page 3 above.

the lake frontage

Estate. R. 1998; Tr. 184: 10-185222, 22029-221 17 (Mort).

is

between the

A reserved to the

That would include 318 feet 0f

the lake frontage

between Parcel

B

and the

Warren’s Beach Lots. R. 1998;

Tr. 184:

1

0- 1 85:22, 220:9-221

:

1

7 (Mort); see also Tr. 8 1 8: 10-14,

820: 19-821 14 (Finney). But based 0n the legal description in the Tricore
:

not included in the

Mort was

was a huge

of opinion.

The

terminated,

Mort immediately

Finney, Chris, and

“front

fundamental difference
lots

performance 0f the

(Mort); Tr. 445:17-23, 446:17-23 (Mullen); EX.

Tr. 106621 1-1067:7 (Lempesis); Tr.

As When Addendum #1
5,

feet represented a

lots drastically affected the overall

2223-2239, 226:8-22, 229:10-13

morning of August

was

He understood that

107:17 (Lempesis). Mort was planning t0 develop four, 75-foot

and losing those

224 (COE 366); see also

the

8-23 (Mort); Tr. 447 :15-22 (Mullen).

and the disputed 3 1 8

part of the deal,

feet,

1

the waterfront property. Tr. 220:9-221 :13, 228: 10-19 (Mort).

Tr. 1106:15-1

along the 318
project. Tr.

all

the 3 1 8 feet

R. 1998; Tr. 44521-8 (Mullen); see also Tr. 185:15-22 (Mort).

surprised. Tr. 222:

was buying

Tricore
feet”

sale.

PSA,

838118-22 (Finney).
tried t0 renegotiate the deal.

Dan met With Mullen t0

On

discuss the 3 1 8 feet 0f lake

frontage. R. 1999; Tr. 81926-82017, 824: 19-825: 12 (Finney). Other topics included an existing

water system that served the Warren’s Beach Lots and Tricore’s need for a source 0f sand t0 ﬁll
in the wetlands

and

raise the

ﬂood plain. R. 1999;

Tr. 819:6-18, 835:6-15 (Finney); Tr. 405221-

40627 (Mullen). Finney took notes of that conversation. See EX. 253
Later on August

5,

At

trial,

neither

Mort nor Lempesis

Tr. 22523-6

recalled the substance 0f the

225:3-15 (Mort); Tr. 1060:15-18, 1062: 14-19, 1114:18—22 (Lempesis). But according to

Finney, he explained that the 3 1 8 feet was not included in

it

8 1 5-16).

Finney spoke to Mort and Lempesis by phone. R. 1999;

(Mort); Tr. 82028-18 (Finney).

call. Tr.

(COE

Addendum #2,

although Mort thought

was. Tr. 820219-822222, 1543:5-1544222, 1545:19-1546122 (Finney). Finney also testiﬁed that
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Lempesis described the dispute
for

moving forward:

(1) there

in the sale. R. 1999; Tr. 821

as involving

was n0

“n0 meeting 0f the minds” and

laid out three options

deal; (2) adjust the purchase price; 0r (3) include other land

218-82323, 880:16-21, 1546:23-1548:3 (Finney). Finney’s

contemporaneous notes document the conversation. See EX. 253
Important here, by the end of the

call,

Finney wondered

(COE

818).

was n0

if there

contract for the

purchase of the Warren Estate’s property but the potential for more negotiation. Tr. 821:18823: 13, 154824-18, 1577:3-25 (Finney). His subsequent communications With

Lempesis conﬁrmed

that.

On August 9,

Finney met With Mort and Lempesis.

(Finney). Finney took notes at this meeting too. EX. 253

(COE

819).

As

Mort and
Tr. 828:1 1-16

before, the meeting

focused 0n the 318 feet of lake frontage, the water system, and ﬁll material. R. 1999; Tr. 828223829221 (Finney); Tr. 225: 16-24 (Mort); Tr. 1065:19-1068: 1

According

t0

Lempesis,

it

was

in this

words “no meeting 0f the minds,” although
1067215, 1115:2-14 (Lempesis). But that

As

told

by Finney, Lempesis

,

1106:15-1 107217 (Lempesis).

meeting — the August 9 meeting — that he used the

in a question, not in a statement. Tr. 1065: 10-

was not how Finney heard

said “the only

it.

Tr.

154926-16 (Finney).

way that the matter would go forward would be

either a reduction in price 0r additional footage 0r other concessions.” Tr. 82928-21 (Finney); see

also Tr. 87225-87328, 875:24-876:15, 879:14-22 (Finney); Tr. 1067:16-1068:1 (Lempesis).

Finney was

now

certain that there

“were moving forward With negotiations

was n0

to try t0 reach a

1549: 1 9-1550: 10 (Finney). In his mind, there
Tricore

PSA.

contract and that Tricore and the

was n0 doubt

Tr. 83324-10, 87225-873223, 87724-87828,

10
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new

Warren Estate

agreement.” Tr. 829222-833zll,

that Tricore

had repudiated the

1577:3-157825 (Finney).

A week later, Lempesis forwarded Finney an August
EX. 224

(COE

16 email written by Mort. R. 1999;

366-67); see also Tr. 241 19-19 (Mort). Mort’s email provided Tricore’s “ﬁnal

analysis” and “proposal t0

move the project

forward.” EX. 224

with “the omission 0f the 300’ plus or minus on the east

we

(COE

Will lose

366). According to Mort,

4

lots in

our development

proforma,” and “this drastically affects the overall performance 0f the proj ect as

Viewed

it.”

EX. 224

(COE

366). “It

is

imperative,” he continued, “t0 have

all

we

initially

0f the balance of

the waterfront included in the development.” Id.

In his “ﬁnal analysis,” Mort’s proposal included a $2.1 million purchase price, the water

system,

all

water rights to the property, 160,000 yards 0f sand/ﬁll material, and an extended

closing date. R. 1999-2000; EX. 224

repudiation 0f the Tricore

833:

1

(COE

366-67). Finney Viewed the email as written

PSA and a proposal for a new contract with new terms.

1-834215, 882:22-88327, 1552:1-1553219 (Finney).

R. 2000; Tr.

The new terms required signiﬁcant

concessions from the Warren Estate: a $300,000 reduction in purchase price, adding the existing

water system and water rights to the

$480,000 and perhaps more.

Tr.

sale,

and allowances for sand/ﬁll material worth

at least

835:3-837:7 (Finney).

Following Mort’s August 16 email, he and Lempesis continued to push for concessions.

On August

19,

Lempesis asked

(Finney); EX. 253

(COE

821).

if the

Warren Estate planned

On August 26, Mort and Lempesis pressed Finney again.

02; Tr. 837: 12-24, 1558:9-1559:2 (Finney); EX. 253

of lake frontage but in a

new

light.

According

was not possible under a county ordinance;

(COE

822-24).

R. 2001-

They discussed the 318

feet

to Mort, developing 75-f00t-wide waterfront lots

lots

had

11
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to counter. Tr. 1553:20-1554z25

t0

be 100

feet wide. Tr.

83824-14 (Finney);

Tr.

227:4-228:4 (Mort); Ex. 253

you know, we just

When they
would not reduce

(COE

822).

T0 Finney, “they were

can’t d0 a development Without

new terms.”

beating the same

spoke again 0n August 30, Finney informed Lempesis that the Warren Estate

the purchase price 0f the property

881:18—882221 (Finney); EX. 253

message Lempesis sent

below $2.4

(COE

825). That

million,

would provide

t0 meet.” R. 2002; EX.

before, Finney understood there

would only g0 through with a new

was no

contract with

7.

was followed by a September

to Finney: “Cliff” s counter is 2.25

g0 south. Are you available

As

0f,

Tr. 838: 15-22 (Finney).

material at $3 a yard, and required $50,000 t0 extend the time t0 close past October

Tr.

drum

and a dollar a yard for

44 (COE

1

dirt.

ﬁll

R. 2002;

text

This could

167).

contract and that the sale of the property

new terms.

Tr.

841 11-84213 (Finney).

As

explained below, the Warren Estate did not accept Tricore’s counteroffer.

The Warren

C.

1.

Estate’s dealings with Stockton

and Brinkmeyer.

In mid-August, Brinkmeyer and Stockton independently learned that
a developer

was

interested in the Priest

Lake property.

While Tricore and the Warren Estate were renegotiating the purchase of the
property, Stockton and Brinkmeyer learned that a developer

was

in

mid-August 2016. From neighborhood

talk,

was

Priest

Lake

interested in the property. This

Brinkmeyer heard the property might be

developed, and he thought the developer might be Mort. R. 2000; Tr. 615220-61624, 616: 12-21,
652: 15-654: 11 (Brinkmeyer).
Tr. 30928-31

1

:

1

He and Mort were

neighbors, and Brinkmeyer reached out t0 him.

8 (Mort); Tr. 61525-9, 654:8-655zl3 (Brinkmeyer).

also considering selling

commercial property he owned, and he was interested

thoughts. Tr. 615:5-16, 655:10-24, 656:16-657:2 (Brinkmeyer).

12
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At the time, Brinkmeyer was
in

Mort’s

They met 0n August

17. Tr. 657:

12-16 (Brinkmeyer). After discussing Brinkmeyer’s

commercial property, the discussion turned

to the

Warren

Estate’s Priest

Lake property.

318:18-3 19:18 (Mort); Tr. 657:23-658z25 (Brinkmeyer). According to the
disclosed that he had the 65 acres under contract.” R. 2000. But that

shows. At

trial,

Mort

initially testiﬁed that

Brinkmeyer

said,

“So

I

is

false. Tr.

not what the record

hear you’ve tied up a piece 0f

But 0n cross—examination, Mort admitted

we were

that testimony

was

32125-32221, 326:2-5 (Mort).

In truth,

19, 32224-6,

to

“Mort

trial court,

property up at Priest Lake” and that he (Mort) “completely laid out the plans 0f what
thinking.” Tr. 193:14-194:6 (Mort).

Tr.

Brinkmeyer actually

said, “I

heard you put an offer 0n the property.” Tr. 321216—

326217-23 (Mort); see also Tr. 659:13-20 (Brinkmeyer). Brinkmeyer did not claim

know that Mort had

“tied

659: 13-20 (Brinkmeyer).

up” or bought the property.

Tr.

And Mort did not completely lay

Brinkmeyer. Tr. 326:2-5 (Mort).

He

321 220-322221 (Mort); see also Tr.
out his development plans to

did not disclose the Tricore

PSA 0r any 0f its terms

or his

proformas, or mention Tricore. Tr. 324:23—326zl (Mort); Tr. 661 27-23 (Brinkmeyer). Mort

showed Brinkmeyer an
With 27

lots;

Mort

aerial

said he

View of the property from Google and a diagram of the property

was doing due

diligence and thought he could develop the wetlands

0n

the property. Tr. 323:24-324z22 (Mort); Tr. 616:5-617z8, 660:24-662:6 (Brinkmeyer).

According

t0 Mort,

Brinkmeyer did nothing inappropriate

in the meeting. Tr. 323:17-23,

33027-33 1 16 (Mort). They exchanged n0 private 0r conﬁdential information. Tr. 3 1922-11
:

(Mort); Tr. 659:24-660223 (Brinkmeyer). Brinkmeyer did not threaten Mort, coerce him,

him, intimidate him, deceive him, defame him, or threaten

13
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litigation. Tr.

lie t0

330110-33 1 :6 (Mort). At

the meeting’s end,

Brinkmeyer had n0 reason

to

know

about Tricore’s existence. Tr. 3 12:4-14,

32626-13 (Mort). After the meeting, Brinkmeyer had n0 thoughts 0f purchasing the property. Tr.
662211-17, 66326-9 (Brinkmeyer).

Stockton learned about the property’s possible development 0n his own. R. 2000; Tr.
506: 13-507:3, 515: 19-25 (Stockton).

Warren Estate planned

to sell

On August 20,

some of its

Priest

at

a neighborhood meeting, he learned the

Lake property and

that the wetlands

property could be developed. Tr. 506:13-50723, 515: 19-25 (Stockton).
consider purchasing the property. Tr. 528:5-529z9 (Stockton).

He

Initially,

he did not

considered ways t0 preserve

the wetlands. R. 2000; Tr. 516:1-5 18: 14, 521 10-52323 (Stockton); see also EX. 39
:

By this

on the

But a few days

later,

time, Stockton

had learned the Warren Estate was considering

(COE

69).

Stockton approached Chris. R. 2001; Tr. 574: 15-57517 (Stockton).
selling

more property than

he was offered. Tr. 572:1 1-573212 (Stockton). Stockton told Chris he’d heard the estate was
selling

Tr.

its

property and that he thought they were operating under a right of ﬁrst refusal. R. 200 1;

57528-16 (Stockton). Chris agreed they were but that Stockton had been offered the property;

Stockton said no, the property he was offered was different. R. 2001; Tr. 575: 17-19 (Stockton).
Chris said talk to Finney. Tr. 575:20-576:1 (Stockton).

2.

Stockton and Brinkmeyer partnered to see if they could buy the
property through Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

After talking to Chris, Stockton spoke with Brinkmeyer. R. 2001; Tr. 57622-22
(Stockton); Tr. 66326-664220 (Brinkmeyer). Brinkmeyer

had assumed Stockton was offered the

property under his right 0f ﬁrst refusal and chose not to buy

14
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it,

but Stockton told him that was not

the case. Tr. 664: 17-66522 (Brinkmeyer). Stockton also spoke t0 Finney, asking if there

contract t0 sell the property, but Finney did not divulge

(Stockton).

Tricore

At

trial,

PSA t0

much. R. 2001;

was a

Tr. 577: 13-578z8

Finney explained that the Warren Estate was not willing

to provide the

Stockton. Tr. 767:4-12 (Finney).

Eventually, Stockton and Brinkmeyer agreed t0 “partner[] up t0 see What his right of ﬁrst
refusal afforded us.” Tr. 665:2-11 (Brinkmeyer); see also R. 2001; Tr. 576:15-577:15 (Stockton).

Brinkmeyer agreed

t0 loan Stockton the

money

for the purchase

and pay for half of the property.

R. 2001; Tr. 533:7-22 (Stockton); Tr. 664: 17-665215 (Brinkmeyer).

Then they handed off the

potential purchase of the property to Stockton’s legal counsel. Tr. 57829-24 (Stockton); Tr.

622:3-62323, 665:1 1-15 (Brinkmeyer).

About a week

was

at Chris’

later,

around August 29, Brinkmeyer also spoke with Finney. Brinkmeyer

house. R. 2002; Tr. 618:15-22, 668222-6693 (Brinkmeyer). Like Finney, Chris

understood the deal With Tricore was over, Tr. 473:14-18, 491 19-492zl9 (Chris), and he told
:

Brinkmeyer “nobody

is

following through,” Tr. 668:22-669:7 (Brinkmeyer); R. 2002. Together

Chris and Brinkmeyer spoke t0 Finney by phone and a meeting was set for September

2.

R.

2002; Tr. 669217-25, 675214-17 (Brinkmeyer); Tr. 740:8-16 (Finney).
3.

On

September

On September 2, the Warren Estate agreed t0

sell the property t0
Stockton and Brinkmeyer under Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

2,

Finney, Chris, and

counsel. R. 2003. Stockton participated

know What t0

Dan met with Brinkmeyer and

by phone.

expect, but he and Stockton

wanted

15
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Tr. 85611-4 (Finney).

Stockton’s legal

Brinkmeyer did not

t0 purchase the property if given the

opportunity. Tr. 675:21-676:7 (Brinkmeyer). Consulting with Finney, Stockton’s attorneys had

prepared a draft 0f a purchase and sale agreement. Tr. 741 24-742225 (Finney). The parties went

about negotiating and revising the document.

Id.; Tr.

680: 16-23, 698225-69924 (Brinkmeyer). At

no time did Stockton and Brinkmeyer pressure 0r coerce the Warren Estate or threaten

t0 sue. Tr.

102: 16-24 (Dan); Tr. 473211-13 (Chris); Tr. 85723-15 (Finney).

From the Warren
estate

was faced With n0

Estate’s perspective,

it

was walking a ﬁne

line.

Finney testiﬁed that the

contract With Tricore because 0f its repudiation and, until signed,

contract With Stockton and Brinkmeyer. Tr. 744:8-18 (Finney).
the line,” Finney explained. Tr. 744: 19, 745:1 1-20 (Finney).

no

“[W]e had two ﬁsh, but none 0n

The Warren

Estate

“made

the

decision to try t0 keep negotiations alive With two potential ﬁsh, wherever they were in the
process.” Tr. 1572:3-5 (Finney).

So on September

2, for the ﬁrst time,

Warren Estate had entered

Finney informed Stockton and Brinkmeyer that the

into a contract With Tricore t0 sell the Priest

Lake property.

620: 17-24, 678:9-22 (Brinkmeyer); Tr. 855219-856225 (Finney); see also EX. 8

(COE

Tr.

106).

Finney wanted them to believe that Tricore was buying the property, despite his belief that the
Tricore

PSA was no

longer valid 0r operational.

He

thought

that:

someone else was buying it, why wouldn’t they revert back
and not buy it.
[I]t would be much better for them to have the Estate own it and
have to pay taxes than them buy it. So whatever information they had, Whatever
... conception they had, Whatever concern they had, it was ﬁne with me that they
had that.
If they didn’t think

Tr.

85429-16 (Finney). Letting Stockton and Brinkmeyer believe the property was under contract,

even when

it

was

not,

“was the only way

t0 serve the

16
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Warren Estate

t0 get

some property sold

and pay
did not

and the loan

that debt for taxes

tell

had paid taxes.”

Tr.

854:20-22 (Finney). So Finney

Stockton and Brinkmeyer that Tricore had repudiated the agreement. Tr. 74423-24,

745221-74621, 85413-6 (Finney).

and

that

we had n0

On the
their attorney

He

feared Stockton and Brinkmeyer “might have

swam

off,

ﬁsh.” Tr. 745:21-746:1 (Finney).
other side 0f the table, Brinkmeyer had no concerns “because the Warrens and

were representing they could

sell it to us.” Tr.

67829-67923 (Brinkmeyer). That

is

well documented in the agreements he and Stockton reached With the Warren Estate t0 purchase
the Priest

Lake property. Before agreeing

t0 sell the property, the

Warren Estate asked

for

indemniﬁcation through a “Real Estate Sale Indemniﬁcation Agreement” (the Indemniﬁcation

(COE

Agreement). R. 2003; Tr. 632:7-633z3, 682:4-19 (Brinkmeyer); EX. 8
In the Indemniﬁcation Agreement, the

owns
it

Warren Estate

a valid and enforceable right of ﬁrst refusal,” that

failed to

it

purchase the property was superior to Tricore and

would repudiate

its

obligations under the Tricore

repudiation could expose the

and Brinkmeyer agreed
Tricore 0r an entity

With

to

Warren Estate

PSA,

PSA. R. 2003; EX.

to liability for

that

Stockton’s right t0

so, that

other prospective purchasers, and that

R. 2003-04; EX. 8

the negotiations complete, the

Brinkmeyer most of Parcel

8

(COE

106).

it

Because the

breach of the Tricore PSA, Stockton

(COE

106-07

Warren Estate agreed

at

1]

1).

to sell Stockton

and

A and Parcels B and C for $2.5 million under a Real Estate Purchase

(the Stockton

PSA). R. 2003; EX. 2

17
1022263 60.8 0076747—00001

into the Tricore

defend and indemnify the estate up to $100,000 0n any claim by

owned by Mort.

and Sale Agreement

all

also represented that “Stockton

had entered

honor Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal before doing

106-09).

(COE

92-97); Tr. 88: 13-21 (Dan); Tr.

741:8-14, 743:10-17 (Finney); see also Tr. 740:8-14, 842:4-13 (Finney). The $2.5 million

purchase price was what Chris and
Tricore

PSA,

the Stockton

from Parcel A. EX. 2

as

for the property. Tr. 153823-22 (Finney). Like the

PSA included a reservation 0f “not less than 200

(COE

Finney testiﬁed, the Warren Estate “ﬁnally had a ﬁsh on the
Tr. 865:6-7 (Finney).

Stockton and Brinkmeyer closed 0n the property. R. 2004; EX. 7
particular reason for closing s0 soon. Stockton

and the Warren Estate agreed.

They did not know

0f waterfront”

Stockton and Brinkmeyer closed 0n the property.

wanted to come out 0f the water and we obliged.”

t0 close,

feet

92).

On September 6,

4.

Now,

Dan asked

Tr.

(COE

On

line

and

that

September

100-01). There

ﬁsh

6,

was n0

and Brinkmeyer negotiated the date they wanted

74622-12 (Finney); Tr. 685218-686212 (Brinkmeyer).

that Tricore’s closing date

was September

7, for

Finney never told them.

Tr.

766:14-76723, 1560:19-1561:1 (Finney); Tr. 685218-68621, 709:14-23 (Brinkmeyer).

Brinkmeyer paid the purchase

price, loaning Stockton his half (Which Stockton later

repaid). Tr. 533: 12-22 (Stockton); Tr. 688: 14-21 (Brinkmeyer).

Estate paid off the outstanding loan and back taxes. EX. 7

assigned their interests in the property t0
t0 handle insurance

(Brinkmeyer); EX. 7

80

(COE

and

PLBM,

taxes. R. 2004; Tr.

(COE

104, 105).

(COE

With

100). Stockton

a limited liability

(COE

Stockton,

533:23-535:19 (Stockton); Tr. 68727-688: 10

The Warren

Estate then deeded the property t0

PSA to

PLBM.

EX.

Stockton and

834); Tr. 777:3-778zl3, 855:4-18 (Finney).

Finney believed the entire transaction was lawful and appropriate.

18
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Warren

and Brinkmeyer

company owned by

956-57). Only after closing, did Finney provide the Tricore

Brinkmeyer. EX. 58

the proceeds, the

Tr. 86522-11 (Finney).

So did Stockton and Brinkmeyer. The Warren Estate never told them — not Finney,

— that Stockton

Chris, 0r

Dan

did not have a valid right 0f ﬁrst refusal 0r that their purchase of the property

was

inappropriate, improper, or unlawful. Tr. 578225-57928 (Stockton); Tr. 668:2-5, 682220-24,

683:18—68428, 686:25-687:6 (Brinkmeyer); Tr. 864:4-19 (Finney).

Had someone done

would not have bought

682220-6832 (Brinkmeyer).

Later, the

the property. Tr. 579218-22 (Stockton); Tr.

Warren Estate had Parcel

legal description

200

feet

of waterfront” reserved from Parcel A.

78528-17 (Finney). The Warren Estate recorded a warranty deed with the

and granted

PLBM an Amended Personal Representative Deed using the

description to clarify the reservation in the Stockton

PSA. EX. 81 (COE

ending negotiations, and Tricore dropped
In the background above,

yard for
Estate

961).

On September 6, Finney informed Lempesis that the Warren Estate was

D.

September

they

A resurveyed and a metes and bounds legal

description prepared t0 clarify the “not less than

Tr. 782: 16-783:11,

s0,

At

1.

dirt.”

would

that time,

EX. 44

sell the

we

left

167).

demands.

Tricore’s negotiations with the

Lempesis had texted Finney

(COE

its

that

Warren Estate on

“Clist counter

Unknown t0 Mort and Lempesis,

the next day, the

reason, according to Finney,

Stockton and Brinkmeyer but did not

was

know

that the

if a deal

Warren Estate was

would be reached.

157128-24 (Finney). Another reason was that the estate was

still

terms. Tr. 1569:8-20 (Finney). Tricore “had already said there
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Warren

property to Stockton and Brinkmeyer. Finney had not told them that the

Warren Estate was negotiating with Stockton and Brinkmeyer. R. 2002;

One

2.25 and a dollar a

is

Tr.

74024-24 (Finney).

set to

meet With

Tr. 74018-16, 842:4-13,

considering Tricore’s

was n0 deal” —

there

new

was “n0 ﬁsh

on the

line”

— and “had repeatedly

indicated that

it

was not

signiﬁcant price reductions, signiﬁcant concessions for
Tr. 157026-15 (Finney).

On

September

dirt,

6, still negotiating,

(COE

them

t0

Id.

Lempesis pressed for an agreement on a reduced
later closing. R.

2004; EX. 44

(COE

167); EX. 50

763220-23, 1564:6-20 (Finney). Lempesis,

now

(COE

E.

(COE

(COE

221); EX. 54

220); Tr.

claiming there was a binding agreement in place,

delivered a check t0 Finney for $10,000 to extend the closing under the Tricore

R. 2004-05; EX. 53

(COE

219). Finney responded after Stockton and Brinkmeyer closed,

terminating the Warren Estate’s negotiations with Tricore. R. 2004; EX. 51

7.

do without

signiﬁcant concessions for water.”

Finney feared Tricore might swim off too.

purchase price, a price on sand/ﬁll, and a
219); R. 2004; Ex. 50

feasible for

PSA to

October

222).

Tricore sued, and after a court trial, the trial court entered judgment in
favor 0f Tricore and against Defendants.

In October 2016, Tricore sued the

performance and damages. R. 24. Tricore

Brinkmeyer as defendants. R.

of good

negligence, and a Violation of the Idaho

PLBM,

later

74. Against the

contract, breach of the covenant

Brinkmeyer, and

Warren Estate and PLBM, seeking speciﬁc

faith

amended

Warren
and

its

complaint, adding Stockton and

Estate, Tricore asserted claims

fair dealing, civil

of breach of

conspiracy, fraud,

Consumer Protection Act. R. 77-8 1. Against Stockton,

Tricore asserted claims 0f tortious interference With a contract, civil

conspiracy, negligence, and a Violation of the Idaho

Consumer Protection

Act. R. 78-81.

Each

defendant (collectively, Defendants) denied the claims. R. 67, 150, 158.
After hearing cross—motions for

summary judgment,

20
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the

trial

court dismissed Tricore’s

negligence claim and the Idaho Consumer Protection Act claim against Stockton, Brinkmeyer,

and

PLBM.

R. 1209-18.

On reconsideration,

Defendants asked the

validity of the property description in the Tricore

speciﬁc performance could be granted
(Sept. 7, 2018); R. 1220, 1227.

The

trial

of frauds and dismissed Defendants’

The

trial

February 2019,

when the

PSA under the

statute

court t0 address the

of frauds and whether

property description was uncertain. See Tr. 10

court found the Tricore

statute

trial

PSA did not Violate the

of fraud afﬁrmative defense. R. 1249-61.

court tried the remaining issues from October 26, 2018 t0

it

issued a

breached the Tricore

memorandum

Consumer Protection Act. R. 1991-2025. As

for Stockton,

court found they tortiously interfered With the Tricore

with the Warren Estate to interfere with the contract.
trial

November 2, 2018.

decision in favor 0f Tricore, ﬁnding the

PSA and the covenant of good faith and fair dealing

Turning t0 the remedy, the

statute

In

Warren Estate

and violated the Idaho

Brinkmeyer, and

PLBM,

the

trial

PSA and engaged in a civil conspiracy

Id.

court found Tricore

was

entitled t0 speciﬁc

performance

of the Tricore PSA, but not damages. R. 2020-23. The court reasoned that legal remedies were
inadequate and that Tricore’s alleged damages for loss 0f use of the property were “pulled out 0f
thin air.” R. 2023.

Tricore

by warranty deed

entitled t0

and

The court ordered Stockton, Brinkmeyer, and

its

for the

sum of $2.4

PLBM to convey the property t0

million. R. 2024-25.

attorney fees and costs against the

It

Warren Estate and

also found Tricore

that Stockton,

PLBM were jointly and severally liable for the fees and costs as conspirators.
On February

8,

2019, the

trial

court entered a judgment. R. 2027.

Warren Estate and Stockton appealed. R. 2261. Brinkmeyer
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was

Brinkmeyer,
R. 2024.

On March 21,

2019, the

also appealed that day. R. 2272.

On

April 10, 2019, Tricore cross—appealed. R. 2302.

Following the judgment, the
costs against Defendants, jointly

trial

and

court awarded Tricore $494,43 1 .11 in attorney fees and

severally. R. 2307.

The

trial

court also clariﬁed the basis of

its civil

conspiracy ﬁnding, explaining that Defendants engaged in a conspiracy t0 breach the

Tricore

PSA, not

on April

t0 interfere With

12, 2019. R.

2321-22.

it.

R. 231 1-13.

On May 24,

The

trial

court entered an

amended judgment

2019, Brinkmeyer ﬁled an amended notice of appeal.

R. 2437. The Warren Estate and Stockton did as well. R. 2449.

Defendants

moved to

bond 0f $672,426.31 —
requiring

them

stay the enforcement 0f the

the attorney fee and cost

t0 preserve the Priest

judgment by posting a supersedeas

award plus 136% — and sought an order

Lake property during the appeal. R. 2284, 2291. The

court ordered Defendants to maintain the property and post a supersedeas

trial

bond 0f $672,426.30,

plus $362,069.61 “[t]0 compensate Tricore for the lost opportunity t0 develop the property while
the matter

is

being appealed.” R. 2434-36. Defendants posted a supersedeas bond in the amount

of $1,034,495.90 in August 2019. R. 22.

ISSUES PRESENTED
1.

Tricore

Did the

trial

ON APPEAL

court err in ﬁnding that Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered With the

PSA when the contract is unenforceable,

Stockton

owned

a valid right of ﬁrst refusal to

purchase the property, and the Warren Estate purposely sold the property under that right?
2.

Did the

when the Warren
3.

trial

court err in ﬁnding that Brinkmeyer

Estate cannot conspire to breach

Did the

trial

own

liable for civil conspiracy

contract?

court err in awarding attorney fees against Brinkmeyer
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its

is

when

there

was no

civil

conspiracy and he had n0 commercial or contractual relationship with Tricore?

Did the

4.

judgment

as

trial

court err in adding $362,069.61 to the supersedeas

bond

t0 stay the

compensation for Tricore’s loss of use 0f the property during the appeal?

STANDARD OF REVIEW
When reviewing

Findings 0f fact and conclusions 0f law.
following a court

trial,

the Court’s review

is

a

trial

court’s decision

limited t0 determining “Whether the evidence

supports the ﬁndings of fact, and whether the ﬁndings of fact support the conclusions 0f law.”

Pocatello Hosp,

LLC v.

Quail Ridge Med. Inv’r, LLC, 156 Idaho 709, 714, 330 P.3d 1067, 1072

(2014) (citation omitted).

As

judges witnesses’ credibility.

the trier 0f fact, the trial court weighs conﬂicting evidence and

Id.

The

trial

court’s ﬁndings 0f fact will be liberally construed in

favor 0f the judgment entered and will not be set aside unless clearly erroneous. Id.

T0 determine

if the trial court’s

ﬁndings are clearly erroneous, the Court “inquires

Whether the ﬁndings 0f fact are supported by substantial and competent evidence.” Opportunity,
L.L.C.

v.

Ossewarde, 136 Idaho 602, 605, 38 P.3d 1258, 1261 (2002) (citation omitted).

“Evidence

is

regarded as substantial

in determining

factual

reasonable

trier

of fact would accept

Whether a disputed point of fact had been proven.”

ﬁnding Will not be deemed clearly erroneous unless,

appellate court

is left

Dep ofHealth
’t

&

The Court
Idaho

if a

at

With a deﬁnite and

Welfare

v.

ﬁrm

after

it

and rely upon

(citation omitted). Id.

Also “a

reviewing the entire record, an

conviction that a mistake has been made.” State,

Roe, 139 Idaho 18, 21, 72 P.3d 858, 861 (2003).

exercises free review over the

trial

court’s conclusions 0f law. Pocatello, 156

714, 330 P.3d at 1072. In doing so, the Court determines “whether the court correctly
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it

stated the applicable law,

(citation omitted).

and whether the legal conclusions are sustained by the

Thus the Court can draw

its

own

facts found.” Id.

conclusions from the facts. Hunter

v.

Shields,

131 Idaho 148, 151, 953 P.2d 588, 591 (1998).

Evidentiarv rulings, decision t0 award attorney fees, and amount of supersedeas bond.

When the

Court reviews an alleged abuse 0f discretion by a

consideration of whether the

(2) acted within the outer

trial court:

the inquiry requires

“(1) correctly perceived the issue as one of discretion;

boundaries 0f its discretion; (3) acted consistently With the legal

standards applicable t0 the speciﬁc choices available to
exercise of reason.”

trial court,

Lunneborg

v.

My Fun Life,

it;

and

(4)

reached

its

decision

by

the

163 Idaho 856, 863, 421 P.3d 187, 194 (2018).

ARGUMENT
I.

The trial court erred
PSA.
The prima

A.

To

in

ﬁnding Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered With the Tricore

facia elements 0f tortious interference with contract.

establish a claim for tortious interference with contract, a plaintiff must prove (1) the

existence of a contract, (2) the defendant’s knowledge 0f the contract, (3) intentional interference

causing breach 0f the contract, and (4) injury to the plaintiff resulting from the breach. Barlow
Int’l

Harvester Ca, 95 Idaho 881, 893, 522 P.2d 1102, 1114 (1974). In addition, for

arise, the intentional interference

must be improper.

BECO Constr.

C0.

v.

J- U-B

liability t0

Eng ’rs, Ina,

145 Idaho 719, 723-24 184 P.3d 844, 848-49 (2008); Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766
(1979). If the plaintiff makes a prima facie case, the burden shifts t0 the defendant t0 prove

conduct was justiﬁable under the circumstances. Barlow, 95 Idaho
In

BECO,

at

893, 522 P.2d at 1114.

the Court adopted the factors in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 767 t0
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1022263 60.8 0076747—00001

its

v.

determine Whether the interference

is

improper. 145 Idaho at 723, 184 P.3d

at

848. Courts must

consider the nature 0f the actor’s conduct, the actor’s motive, the plaintiff’ s interests, the interest
the actor sought to advance, the social interests involved, the proximity of the actor’s conduct to

the interference, and the relations

between the

parties. Id. In a like

similar tort of tortious interference with prospective

Whether the actor had an improper purpose

Highland Enters.,
interference

As

Inc.

v.

to

manner, when addressing the

economic advantage, Idaho courts consider

harm the

plaintiff or

used a wrongful means.

Barker, 133 Idaho 330, 338, 986 P.2d 996, 1004 (1999). The

must be wrongful by some measure beyond the

fact

of the interference

for justiﬁcation, the issue does not arise unless the interference

The defense

Barlow, 95 Idaho

at

893, 522 P.2d at 1114.

issue in each case

is

Whether the actor’s conduct

upon a consideration 0f the
permitted despite
Torts § 767 cmt.

its

a).

relative signiﬁcance

is

is

would be wrongful.

requires similar considerations. “‘The

justiﬁable under the circumstances; whether,

0f the factors involved, his conduct should be

expected effect of harm to another.”

“‘What

itself. Id.

Id.

(quoting Restatement (Second) 0f

“unwarranted” interference depends on the facts of each case.”’

Id. (citation omitted).

B.

tortiously interfere With the Tricore PSA because the
unenforceable and Tricore cannot recover damages for its breach.

Brinkmeyer did not
contract
1.

is

Tricore cannot maintain an interference claim against Brinkmeyer
the Tricore

The
that

would

LLC v.

ﬁrst requirement 0f tortious interference with contract

entitle a party to that contract to

recover damages for

is

its

“the existence of a contract

breach.” Syringa Networks,

Idaho Dep’t 0fAdmin., 155 Idaho 55, 64, 305 P.3d 499, 508 (2013).
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if

PSA is void.

On appeal,

the

Warren Estate argues

the trial court erred in ﬁnding the Tricore

PSA was

an enforceable contract

because there was n0 meeting 0f the minds and/or Tricore repudiated the contract. See Warren
Estate’s Br. at §

IV.C and D, adopted by reference.

interference claim against

If the

Brinkmeyer must necessarily

Court agrees, Tricore’s tortious

fail.

One cannot tortiously

interfere With

a non-existent 0r unenforceable contract. Syringa Networks, 155 Idaho at 64, 305 P.3d at 508.

Tricore cannot maintain an interference claim against Brinkmeyer

2.

in this action, the Tricore

The Warren Estate

also seeks t0 avoid the Tricore

unenforceable under the statute 0f frauds

would be voidable

at the election

at the

found

PSA on the basis

that the contract

time 0f its alleged breach. If so, the Tricore

606 (2013). As a party

the legal relations created

by

the Tricore

Idaho 625, 629, 200 P.3d 1174, 1178 (2009); see also Idaho Code
satisfy the statute

was

PSA

LLC v. Monsanto

t0 this adversary proceeding, the

PSA based 0n the

property description to designate “exactly” the property to be sold. See

For a property description t0

if,

t0 violate the statute 0f frauds.

0f the Warren Estate. See Silicon Int ’l Ore,

C0., 155 Idaho 538, 551, 3 14 P.3d 593,

Warren Estate can avoid

PSA is

Ray

v.

failure

of the

Frasure, 146

§ 9-505.

of frauds, the quantity,

identity, 0r

boundaries must be determinable from the face of the contract or by reference to extrinsic
evidence to Which the contract speciﬁcally refers. Lexington Heights Dev.,

140 Idaho 276, 281, 92 P.3d 526, 531 (2004). Contrary t0 the
1258, the Tricore

feet

trial

LLC v.

Crandlemire,

court’s ﬁndings at R. 1257-

PSA does not meet that standard given the reservation of “not less than 200

ofwaterfront” from Parcel A, see

id. at

281-83, 92 P.3d

at

53 1-33.

What property

is

being

sold and the boundaries 0f the property cannot be determined from that language, regardless 0f

26
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the parties’ agreement to ﬁgure

Planning and Zoning provisions

Thus the Tricore
for

is

damages and

no contract

155 Idaho

is

later.

See

id.

Also, the reference to Bonner County

not extrinsic evidence that can identify the reservation. See

PSA violates the

statute

0f frauds and

would

entitle Tricore t0

305 P.3d

at 508.

recover damages for

id.

unenforceable both in an action

is

for speciﬁc performance. Id. at 286, 92 P.3d at 536. Since that

that

at 64,

out

it

its

the case, there

is

breach. See Syringe: Networks,

Nor could Brinkmeyer have caused

a breach 0r Tricore

suffered an injury from a breach. Tricore cannot maintain a tortious interference action against

Brinkmeyer. See Warren Estate’s Br.

Brinkmeyer did not

C.

owned

at §

IV.B, adopted by reference.

tortiously interfere With the Tricore

a valid right 0f ﬁrst refusal 0r

if

PSA if Stockton

Brinkmeyer had a good

faith belief in

its validity.

Tricore cannot maintain an interference claim against Brinkmeyer
because Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal is valid and superior.

1.

a.

Before

trial,

the

trial

The trial court erred
was unenforceable.

in

ﬁnding Stockton’s right of ﬁrst refusal

court excluded testimony of statements

concerning Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal under the deadman’s

and I.R.E. 601(b). R. 13 1 8;

deadman’s

statute

Tr. 23:5-17 (Oct. 26, 2018).

statute,

Also the

trial

Bill

Warren

Idaho Code § 9-202(3)

court found that the

rendered Stockton’s right of ﬁrst refusal legally unenforceable as a matter of

law. R. 1318; Tr. 21 10-23217 (Oct. 26, 2018).
:

the entirety 0f the

made by

trial

The deadman’s
“[p]arties 0r assignors

The

court

was wrong, and

that error infected

court’s analysis 0f Tricore’s tortious interference claim.

statute has

no application

to this lawsuit.

of parties t0 an action or proceeding

27
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trial

...,

It

prohibits testimony

by

upon a claim 0r demand

the

against

the estate of a deceased person, as to any

communication 0r agreement, not

before the death 0f such deceased person.” Idaho
evidence, the statute’s application

is

Code

in writing, occurring

§ 9-202(3); I.R.E. 601(b).

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Lunders

Snyder, 131 Idaho 689, 699, 963 P.2d 372, 382 (1998). Here the

trial

v.

As

a rule of

Estate 0f

court acted inconsistent

With applicable legal standards.
In Lunders, the Court explained that the deadman’s statute “prohibit[s] a party

making a

Claim against an estate from testifying as t0 any unwritten communication With the deceased.”
at

698-99, 963 P.2d at 381-82. Thus,

deceased person.” Argyle
does not apply

v.

it

“prohibits testimony introduced against the estate 0f a

Slemaker, 99 Idaho 544, 547—48, 585 P.2d 954, 957-58 (1978).

if the party’s

claim

is

Id.

It

not against the estate. Id. Stockton, of course, maintained no

claim 0r demand against the Warren Estate and sought t0 introduce testimony concerning Bill’s
unwritten communications against Tricore.

Moreover, the Warren Estate, the party entitled t0 obj ect to the testimony, did not obj ect.2
See Smith
asserted

v.

Smith, 95 Idaho 477, 482, 511 P.2d 294, 299 (1973) (holding statute

by a representative 0r a party having an

claimants against the estate);

statute

may be waived by the

Chapman

v.

interest in the estate;

it is

may

only be

not available t0

Booth, 71 Idaho 359, 232 P.2d 668 (1951) (holding

estate). In fact, like Stockton, the

Warren Estate sought

to

introduce testimony concerning Bill and Elaine’s communications about the right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

2

Even

deadman’s

apply to Tricore claims and Tricore could use the
does not apply t0 evidence used t0 defend against a claim.
Ireland Bank, 116 Idaho 708, 711 n.1, 779 P.2d 22, 25 n.1 (Ct. App. 1989).
if the

statute did

statute as a bar t0 evidence, the statute

Lowry

v.

28
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2018) (offer of proof). Thus, the deadman’s

Tr. 25:8-17 (Oct. 26,

evidence and the

trial

court erred in excluding

statute

does not bar such

it.

Nevertheless, Bill and Elaine’s unwritten communications were not the only evidence of

Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal. Both the Warren Estate and Stockton acknowledged

(COE

56822-13, 56927-57023 (Stockton); Tr. 705221-706217 (Brinkmeyer); EX. 8

trial

court recognized that “Bill and Elaine

Warren promised to give Stockton

it.

106).

See Tr.

Even

the

the ﬁrst right to

purchase any additional Priest Lake property they offered for sale.” R. 1995. That means that
Stockton has a “contractual right t0 meet the terms 0f a third party’s higher offer.” See Right 0f
First Refusal, Black’s

Law Dictionary (1 1th ed.

2019).

Indeed, a “preemptive right 0f ﬁrst refusal

Bowling Lanes,

And While

the

Inc.

trial

v.

As

was offered

him to

evaluate

it

is

communicated

and make a decision.” Gyurkey

to Stockton, as the record undeniably

v.

Moreover, a preemptive right to purchase
the statute of frauds requires

it

all interests

is

made

was

listed, that is

to

him

in such a

not

upon

form as

to

t0

to Tricore

had not been

shows and the Warren Estate admitted.

(COE

Tr.

106).

valid even if the right

in real property to

is

not in writing. While

be accomplished through a writing,

does not prevent an oral contract from being formed, Treasure Valley

29
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it

Babler, 103 Idaho 663, 666, 651 P.2d

790:10-15 (Finney); Tr. 553:1-4, 574:25-575zl9 (Stockton); EX. 8

Idaho Code § 9-503,

670 P.2d 1294, 1296 (1983).

the property before

928, 931 (1982). Before September 2, the entire offer

communicated

1,

the holder of a right 0f ﬁrst refusal, Stockton “cannot be called

exercise or lose that right unless the entire offer

enable

a legitimate contractual right.” Meridian

Meridian Athletic ASS ’n, 105 Idaho 509, 51

court found Stockton

entirely true. R. 2015.

is

Gastroenterology Specialists, P.A.

The

statute

v.

Woods, 135 Idaho 485, 489

n.1,

20 P.3d 21, 25

of frauds only prevents oral contracts from being enforced by a court

if

n.1 (2001).

one party

refuses t0 perform. Id.; see also Silicon, 155 Idaho at 55 1, 3 14 P.3d at 606 (“[A] contract failing

under the

A

0f frauds

statute

is

not void but

Law ofContracts

Treatise 0n the

is

§ 7: 13,

voidable.”); 3

Westlaw

Samuel Williston

(4th ed. database updated July 2019)

(“Indeed, With respect to the Statute of Frauds, though the Statute

by

entire transaction oral,

unenforceable 0r voidable

And here,
that Stockton

the

owned

the majority rule, the contract

at the election

id.

The

of frauds

statute

perform the contract. Frantz

(COE

v.

is

106).

wholly unsatisﬁed, and the

whom enforcement is

to perform.

The Warren

inapplicable

is

not absolutely void, but only

See EX. 8

a right 0f ﬁrst refusal t0 purchase the Priest

t0 other prospective purchasers. EX. 8

performed. See

is

0f the party against

Warren Estate did not refuse

& Richard A. Lord,

(COE

Lake property

sought”).

106).

that

It

agreed

was superior

Estate and Stockton also fully

when the parties mutually

accept and

Parke, 111 Idaho 1005, 1008-09, 729 P.2d 1068, 1071-72 (Ct.

was wrong

ﬁnd that

the deadman’s statute barred testimony of

App. 1986). The

trial

Bill’s statements

and rendered Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal invalid and unenforceable.

court

b.

As a matter 0f law, Tricore cannot establish interference With
contract if Stockton owns a valid right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

Because Stockton owns a
tortious interference With Tricore

to purchase the

Warren

at 51 1,

of ﬁrst refusal, he and Brinkmeyer cannot be

right

PSA.

Estate’s Priest

Bowling Lanes, 105 Idaho

to

A valid right of ﬁrst refusal means that Stockton’s right

Lake property was superior

670 P.2d

at

t0 Tricore’s.

See Meridian

1296; Gyurkey, 103 Idaho at 666, 651 P.2d at 931.
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liable for

Because Stockton’s contractual right

to the property is entitled t0 protection over Tricore

other purchasers, Stockton should have received a bona

reservation), B,

and

C

and given the opportunity

to

ﬁde

meet the

669, 651 P.2d at 934. That did not happen until September

Once

(COE

the

Warren Estate made

92). Stockton,

offer for Parcels

offer.

and

A (minus the

See Gyurkey, 103 Idaho

at

2.

the offer, Stockton and

Brinkmeyer accepted. See EX. 2

With Brinkmeyer as his partner, simply exercised his

own

legal right.

It

follows that Stockton and Brinkmeyer did not intentionally 0r improperly interfere to cause a

breach 0f the Tricore PSA. See,

e.g., Crivelli v.

2000) (ﬁnding, as a matter 0f law, that

GM’s

Gen. Motors Corp, 215 F.3d 386, 395 (3d Cir.

exercise 0f its right of ﬁrst refusal t0

buy a

franchisee did not constitute an improper action under Pennsylvania’s tort 0f intentional

interference With contract); Sines

v.

Maddox, 122 Wash. App. 1023, 2004

(2004) (ﬁnding under Washington law, “[b]ecause Mr.
exercise the right 0f ﬁrst refusal, there

is

n0 proof in

Maddox had the

this record that

WL

1528236,

at

*2

apparent legal right t0

an improper purpose 0r

improper means were used to interfere with Mr. Sines’ attempted sale of stock”).
Further, Stockton

right.

As Barlow

permitted despite

1114

recognizes, whether interference

its

is

justiﬁed asks if the

C“

conduct should be

expected effect of harm to another.”’ Barlow, 95 Idaho

(citation omitted).

(1960),

and Brinkmeyer’s purchase of the property was justiﬁed as a valid legal

Which Barlow

Here the answer

cites as authority

is

yes. Mitchell

v.

at 893,

Aldrich, 122 Vt. 19, 163

0n justiﬁcation, explains

this well: “It is

522 P.2d

at

A.2d 833

only

When the

actor participated in the exercise of an absolute right, equal or superior to the right invaded, that
interference can be justiﬁed as a matter 0f law.” Id. at 24-25, 163
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A.2d

at 837.

Thus, as a matter

law, Tricore cannot establish interference With the Tricore

PSA against Brinkmeyer,

and the

claim must be dismissed.

The trial court misapplied the law of interference t0 ﬁnd that
Brinkmeyer intentionally and improperly interfered with the Tricore

2.

PSA Without justiﬁcation.
Even

if the

Court ﬁnds that Stockton’s right of ﬁrst refusal does not require the dismissal

of Tricore’s tortious interference claim as a matter of law, the
failed t0 properly apply the

affected the

outcome of the
a.

law 0n interference. The

trial

trial

court’s analysis 0f the claim

court’s legal error

was

prejudicial

and

trial.

The

trial

court used the

wrong

legal standard to

ﬁnd

“improper intent” by Brinkmeyer.
The

trial

court used the

alleged interference

wrong

legal standard in

ﬁnding

was improper. Tricore must not only

intended to interfere with the performance of the Tricore
improper. See

BECO,

145 Idaho

at

that Stockton

and Brinkmeyer’s

establish that Stockton

and Brinkmeyer

PSA but also that such interference was

724, 184 P.3d at 849; Restatement (Second) 0f Torts § 766.

Despite recognizing that Tricore must establish improper interference, the
consider any of the relevant factors identiﬁed in

trial

court did not

BECO and Restatement (Second) of Torts

§ 767,

such as the interest Stockton and Brinkmeyer sought to advance, their motive, or the nature of
their conduct.

See R. 2014- 1 6. Nor did the

trial

court consider Whether they had an improper

purpose to harm Tricore or used a wrongful means.
Instead the

trial

court relied 0n passages from Highland Enterprises and

Bybee

v.

Isaac,

145 Idaho 251, 178 P.3d 616 (2008), asserting the passages were instructive 0n What constitutes
the requisite “improper intent.” R. 2014-15 (emphasis added).
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But the passages the

trial

court

relied

0n address the “intent” 0f the “intentional interference” requirement, not whether such

intentional interference

at

was improper. See R. 2015

(citing

Highland, 133 Idaho

at 340,

986 P.2d

1006, and Bybee, 145 Idaho at 259, 178 P.3d at 624). Confusing “intent” With Whether the

interference

The

trial

was “improper” and

court used the

wrong

failing to address the latter question

analysis to

The

b.

trial

ﬁnd the

was

alleged interference

error.

See R. 2014-16.

was improper.

court failed t0 consider Brinkmeyer’s good-faith

belief in the validity 0f the right 0f ﬁrst refusal.

The

trial

court’s legal error, however, goes deeper.

instructs that interference is not

The law 0f interference with

improper when one advances a valid legal interest in good

See Restatement (Second) 0f Torts §§ 773, 767. That principle
tenets that underlie the claim: (1) intentional

the contract and (2) the interference

right

is

it

at all.

and wrongful interference must cause the breach 0f

must be Without justiﬁcation. Yet believing
trial

that Stockton’s

court did not

R. 2012-20.

T0 be more

speciﬁc, the

trial

Brinkmeyer reasonably believed
purchase the 65 acres

is

court reasoned that the “argument that either Stockton or

that Stockton possessed

ludicrous.” R. 2017. Also:

any legitimate right of ﬁrst refusal

“Any competent

attorney

court

was

(at pp.

correct, that

0f ﬁrst refusal was

Id.

27-30), Idaho law does not support those ﬁndings. But even if the

As
trial

does not negate Stockton and Brinkmeyer’s good-faith belief that the right

valid. Their belief was directly relevant to

33
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t0

would have

immediately informed them that Stockton’s so-called right 0f ﬁrst refusal was invalid.”
explained above

faith.

mostly captured in the two key

of ﬁrst refusal was unquestionably invalid and unenforceable, the

consider

contract

determining Whether their alleged

intentional interference

was

initially

wrongful and,

if so,

The same considerations and evidence apply
Stockton and Brinkmeyer’s motive (was

it

t0

justiﬁed under the circumstances.

each

issue.

Wrongfulness considers

proper or improper), the interests they sought to

advance, and the nature of their conduct (was

it

proper or improper). See

BECO,

145 Idaho

at

724, 184 P.3d at 849; Restatement (Second) 0f Torts § 767. So does justiﬁcation. See Barlow, 95

Idaho

522 P.2d

at 893,

Chiropractic Clinic

v.

at

Nampa Restaurant Corp,

surety’s insistence that a

refusal t0

pay

good

there

was
is

to

harm

the plaintiff. 127 Idaho 283, 286,

good-faith belief in one’s

v.

v.

900 P.2d 191, 194 (1995).

interests.

Advancing

767

improper or

& cmt. d; Restatement (Second) of Torts

is

not improper interference.”); Tex. Beef Cattle

Green, 921 S.W.2d 203, 211 (TeX. 1996) (holding that justiﬁcation

exercise of one’s

is

legal interests in

Pierce Cty. Med. Bureau, Ina, 930 P.2d 288, 300 (Wash. 1997)

(“Exercising in good faith one’s legal interests
C0.

own legal

that the surety’s

weight in determining whether the interference

justiﬁed. See Restatement (Second) 0f Torts §

Leingang

the Court found a workers’ compensation

by another provider did not support an inference

faith carries substantial

§ 773; see also

Downey

worker receive treatment from a designated medical provider and

for treatment

“sole motivation”

Then

1114; Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766. Thus in

own legal rights

that claim ultimately proves t0

advice. See Ins. Assocs. Corp.

based on either the

or a good-faith claim to a colorable legal right, even though

be mistaken). That
v.

is

is

true

even

Hansen, 116 Idaho 948, 952

if Brinkmeyer

n.2,

received bad legal

782 P.2d 1230, 1234 n.2

(1989) (ﬁnding that while advice 0f counsel by itself is not a defense to a tortious interference
claim,

it is

a factor t0 be considered in determining whether the interference

34
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was

intentional).

The evidence

at trial

conclusively showed that, at the very

Brinkmeyer had a good-faith belief in the
to that belief solely

on

their

validity

least,

0f the right 0f ﬁrst

Stockton and

own. The Warren Estate expressly told them

that Stockton

valid and enforceable right 0f ﬁrst refusal” t0 purchase the property. EX. 8

that

it

had

They did not come

refusal.

(COE

“failed to afford” Stockton an opportunity to purchase the property

proposed by Tricore.
Tricore’s and

all

Id. It stated that Stockton’s “right t0

other prospective purchasers, and

it

their attorney

wished

were representing they could

It

stated

on the terms

purchase” the property was superior t0
to

honor Stockton’s legal

As Brinkmeyer testiﬁed, he had n0 concerns about buying
Warrens and

106).

“owns a

sell

it

right. Id.

the property “because the

t0 us.” Tr. 67829-67923

(Brinkmeyer). Having been told by the Warren Estate that Stockton could buy the property, he

and Stockton

did. Tr.

601 :1-16 (Stockton);

Tr. 675:21-67923, 68121-24,

69228-12 (Brinkmeyer).

Brinkmeyer’s belief in the validity 0f Stockton’s right of ﬁrst refusal was far from “ludicrous.”

Even

if the

Warren

were wrong, Brinkmeyer’s belief is a

Estate’s statements

factor in deciding

Whether the alleged interference was intentional or wrongful and unjustiﬁed. The judgment
should be reversed for this reason too.

The evidence does not

D.

establish that

Brinkmeyer intentionally and

improperly interfered with the Tricore TSA, causing

Even

if

breach.

Stockton’s right 0f ﬁrst refusal does not warrant the dismissal 0f Tricore’s

tortious interference claim as a matter 0f law, 0r

the evidence at

its

trial

does not align With

liability.

remand

for a proper determination 0f the claim,

The law 0f interference With

contract seeks t0

protect dealings that have been reduced t0 contract. See Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766
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cmt. b.

It is

0n Torts

aimed

§ 129, at

economic

at protecting

978 (5th

ed. 1984).

relationships.

But the mere

fact that

With the Warren Estate With knowledge of the Tricore
inducement.

As

W. Page Keaton

et a1.,

Prosser

& Keeton

Stockton and Brinkmeyer contracted

PSA is not the same

as improper

the Restatement explains:

One does not induce another to commit a breach of contract With a third person
under the rule stated in this Section when he merely enters into an agreement With
knowledge that the other cannot perform both it and his contract
For instance, B is under contract t0 sell certain goods t0
C. He offers t0 sell them to A, Who knows of the contract. A accepts the offer and
receives the goods. A has not induced the breach and is not subj ect t0 liability
the other With

with the third person.

under the rule stated in

this Section.

Restatement (Second) of Torts § 766, cmt.

90

(“It is

see also Prosser

& Keeton 0n

Torts § 129, at 989-

not enough that he merely has reaped the advantages 0f the broken contract after the

contracting party has withdrawn from

bargain

n;

is

it

0f his

own motion. Thus

acceptance 0f an offered

not in itself inducement of the breach of a prior inconsistent contract.

So What happens When,

as here, the

Warren Estate believes there

for the property With Tricore, actively negotiates with Stockton

property, and represents to

them

property? According t0 the

trial court,

did actually lure Chris and

owns

its

to sell

them

the

a valid legal and superior right to the

those circumstances reveal that “Stockton and Brinkmeyer
Tricore” and “succeeded in

existing contract.” R. 2015-16. Setting aside the trial court’s

ﬁndings are clearly erroneous. The Court should be

that a mistake has

..”).

n0 existing contract

and Brinkmeyer

Dan Warren to breach their contract With

inducing the Estate t0 breach
legal error, those

that Stockton

is

.

left

with an abiding belief

been made.

The evidence undeniably shows

that the

Warren Estate took an

36
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active role in soliciting

Stockton and Brinkmeyer t0 enter into the Stockton PSA. Believing Tricore had repudiated the
Tricore

PSA, Finney was

to renegotiate the deal

actively casting for a

contract With

hook. Mort and Lempesis continued

towards the end of August, Which Finney took t0

contract and the sale 0f the

new

new ﬁsh t0

Warren

new terms.

mean that there was no

Lake property would only g0 through With a

Estate’s Priest

R. 2000; Tr. 821 :18-823213, 829:22-834:15, 841 :1-842z3, 872:5-

873223, 877:4-87818, 882222-883z7, 1548:4-18, 1552: 1-1553219, 157723-1578z5 (Finney).

Thus, by the time Stockton and Brinkmeyer approached Finney about the property in late

August, Finney believed the Warren Estate “had two ﬁsh, but none 0n the line.” Tr. 74428-19
(Finney).

He and the Warren Estate had made the

decision t0 negotiate with Tricore, on one

hand, and With Stockton and Brinkmeyer, 0n the other —

i.e.,

“t0

keep negotiations alive with two

potential ﬁsh.” Tr. 745:1 1-20, 1572:3-5 (Finney). In negotiations with Stockton

Finney chose

to

inform them about the Tricore

PSA — but only its

and Brinkmeyer,

existence and price. See Tr.

855:19-856:25 (Finney).

Finney was intentionally playing both ﬁsh.
believe that Tricore

them

that Tricore

was buying

Estate

1

,

Stockton and Brinkmeyer to

the property, despite his belief otherwise, and he did not

had repudiated the

was concerned they would not buy
Tr. 745:21-746:

He wanted

deal. Tr. 74423-24, 745221-746:

the property if they did not think

1

,

85423-16 (Finney).

someone

85429-22 (Finney). At the same time, Finney did not

tell

tell

else

He

was buying

Tricore the

Warren

was negotiating with Stockton and Brinkmeyer. Given Mort and Lempesis’ pressure

renegotiate the Tricore

PSA, Finney

In negotiating With the

feared Tricore might

Warren

Estate, Stockton
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swim

it.

to

off too. Tr. 1570:6-15 (Finney).

and Brinkmeyer had n0 improper motive

and used no improper means.
right

On

September

2,

they acted solely in furtherance of Stockton’s

0f ﬁrst refusal — What they believed, and were

Tr. 675221-67923, 681:1-24,

The Warren Estate never
that their purchase

told,

was a

legitimate and valid legal right.

69218-12 (Brinkmeyer); Tr. 601:1-16 (Stockton); EX. 8

(COE

106).

said that Stockton did not have a valid legal interest in the property 0r

of the property was inappropriate, improper, 0r unlawful in any way.

Tr.

66822-5, 682120-24, 683218-684z8, 686:25-687:6 (Brinkmeyer); Tr. 578:25-579:8 (Stockton); Tr.

86424-19 (Finney).

had a ﬁsh on the

When all was

line,”

The evidence
lured the

and

it

at trial

Warren Estate

said and done, as Finney testiﬁed, the

Warren Estate “ﬁnally

“obliged.” Tr. 865:6-7 (Finney).

simply does not support that Stockton and Brinkmeyer induced 0r

to breach the Tricore

TSA without justiﬁcation.

In the end, Tricore’s

economic relationship With the Warren Estate needs n0 protection from Stockton and
Brinkmeyer.

It

needs protection from the Warren Estate t0 the extent the law allows.

The trial court erred
Warren Estate.

II.

in

ﬁnding Brinkmeyer

In addition t0 ﬁnding that Stockton and

PSA,

the

trial

liable for civil conspiracy

Brinkmeyer tortiously interfered With the Tricore

court found they engaged in a civil conspiracy with the

each 0f them liable for the conduct of the others.” R. 2020.
ruling

Initially,

on ﬁnding there was an agreement between Defendants

obj ective,

i.e.,

interference with the Warren-Tricore

attorney fees and costs t0 Tricore, the

trial

Warren

the

trial

Estate,

“making

court based

its

“t0 accomplish an unlawful

PSA.” 1d. But

later, in

making an award of

court clariﬁed that the unlawful obj ective 0f the

conspiracy was “for the Estate t0 breach 0f the Warren-Tricore PSA.” R. 231
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with the

1,

23 14. Because

one cannot conspire

t0

breach one’s

own

contract, the trial court erred as a matter 0f law.

Civil conspiracy cannot arise absent

A.

an underlying

civil

wrong.

Civil conspiracy does not afford a plaintiff an independent claim for relief. “‘It

well settled that a conspiracy t0 commit an actionable wrong

Wrongful

acts

committed by conspirators resulting

action.”’ Dahlquist

v.

is

not in itself a cause 0f action.

in injury alone give rise t0 a cause

C“
is

the civil

wrong committed

conspiracy, not the conspiracy itself.” Wesco Autobody Supply, Inc.

898, 243 P.3d 1069, 1086 (2010) (citation omitted). If no civil

Thus

relief.

McPheters

v.

if the trial court erred in

interference and/or that the

Brinkmeyer engaged

v.

wrong

Ernest, 149 Idaho 881,

is

committed

as the

is not,

by

Maile, 138 Idaho 391, 395, 64 P.3d 317, 321 (2003).

ﬁnding

that Stockton

Warren Estate breached

and Brinkmeyer are

the Tricore

PSA,

it

liable for tortious

also erred in

ﬁnding

that

in a civil conspiracy.

Because the Warren Estate cannot conspire t0 breach the Tricore PSA, then
Brinkmeyer cannot conspire with it.

B.

But even

if the

underlying claims stand,

civil

and Brinkmeyer. The Warren Estate cannot conspire
conspiracy

of

as the obj ective 0f the

obj ective of the conspiracy, the claim fails as a matter 0f law because civil conspiracy

a claim for

quite

Mattson, 40 Idaho 378, 233 P. 883, 886 (1925) (citation omitted). The

essence 0f a Claim for civil conspiracy

itself,

is

is

an agreement to commit a

conspiracy itself is not a

cause 0f action, and,

tort,

When an

of the action.” 40 Idaho

and, until

act is

at 386,

233

tort.

some

is still

to breach its

own

inapplicable t0 Stockton

contract. In Idaho, a civil

In Dahlquz'st, the Court explained that a “civil

act is

done by the conspirators, there

done Which amounts
P. at 885. Indeed,
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conspiracy

t0

an actionable

tort,

arises

then that

n0 Idaho court has recognized a

n0

is

the gist

civil

conspiracy claim based 0n a contracting party breaching

its

own

contract.

Other jurisdictions consistently reject such conspiracy claims. For instance, the California

Supreme Court has explained
from interference with

its

that “[b]ecause a party to a contract

(Cal. 1994).

tort

performance, he 0r she cannot be bootstrapped into

pejorative plea of conspiracy.” Applied Equip. Corp.

459

owes no

Many other courts

v.

F.

tort liability

by

the

Litton Saudi Arabia Ltd, 869 P.2d 454,

agree. See, e.g., Ariate

Commonwealth Tankship Owners, Ltd, 310

duty to refrain

Compania Naviera, SA.

v.

Supp. 416, 421 (S.D.N.Y. 1970) (“[O]ne

contracting party does not have a cause 0f action against the other for conspiring t0 breach the
contract or for inducing the breach”); Harris

v.

Equitable Life Assurance Soc ’y, 147 F. Supp.

478, 478 (S.D. Iowa 1957) (“‘Charges that a party

connection With

its

colluded 0r conspired With others in

breach will not serve t0 convert what

is

essentially a separable cause

action for a breach 0f contract into a joint cause of action for

3”
tort.

0f

(citation omitted)).

Thus, the Warren Estate, as a contracting party, cannot be held liable for the tort 0f
conspiracy to breach the Tricore PSA.
Tricore

And if the Warren Estate

cannot conspire to breach the

PSA, then Stockton and Brinkmeyer cannot conspire with

the association of at least

two

parties.

McPheters, 138 Idaho

at

it.

A civil conspiracy requires

395, 64 P.3d at 321. Because a

party t0 the contract cannot be held liable as a conspirator to breach their

“obviously

Callahan

v.

is fatal t0

own

contract,

any similar claim against the [defendant’s] alleged coconspirator.”

Gutowski, 488 N.Y.S.2d 519, 521 (App. Div. 1985); see also Sharma

v.

Ship Mgmt. Corp, 699 F. Supp. 440, 445 (S.D.N.Y. 1988) (“The conspiracy claims
the [third-party] defendants because

Skaarup
fail

against

New York law does not recognize a claim against a third
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it

party for conspiring with a party to the contract to breach the contract”).

Because the Warren Estate cannot conspire
the

court’s determination that

trial

owes n0

Warren Estate and

The

III.

trial

trial

must

rely

civil

PSA as

a matter 0f law,

conspiracy must be reversed.

0n separate claims

tortious interference against Stockton

for breach

He

0f contract

and Brinkmeyer.

court erred in ﬁnding Stockton and Brinkmeyer jointly and severally

liable for Tricore’s attorney fees

The

breach the Tricore

Brinkmeyer committed

contractual duty t0 Tricore. Tricore

against the

t0

based 0n

civil

conspiracy.

court found a civil conspiracy to saddle Stockton and Brinkmeyer with Tricore’s

attorney fees: “[h]aVing found a civil conspiracy amongst

all

the defendants, the

judgment

against defendants for said costs and attorney’s fees shall be joint and several.” R. 2024; see also

R. 2282. Ultimately, the
against

trial

all

trial

court awarded attorney fees and costs in favor of Tricore and

Defendants, “jointly and severally, in the total amount 0f $494,43 1 .1 1.” R. 2322.

court’s decision to

award attorney fees

is

reviewed for abuse of discretion. Stout

v.

A

Key

Training Corp, 144 Idaho 195, 196, 158 P.3d 971, 972 (2007).

A.

Civil conspiracy cannot justify

Because
in

civil

conspiracy

and 0f themselves, give

made

the point that

it

rise t0

is

an award 0f attorney

fees

and

costs.

not an independent cause of action, conspiracy claims do not,

claims for attorney fees. The

was “not awarding

trial

court recognized that and

fees for the claim of conspiracy itself, only for the

conduct the defendants conspired to commit.” R. 23 12-13. Regardless, a court cannot award
attorney fees and costs unless they are authorized

Idaho Pub. Unis.

Comm ’n,

statute 0r

by

contract.

Idaho Power C0.

102 Idaho 744, 751, 639 P.2d 442, 449 (1981); 1.R.C.P. 54(e)(1).
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by

v.

There

is

And n0

n0 contract between Tricore and Brinkmeyer and thus n0 contractual basis
statute allows

an award 0f attorney fees for

Without a basis

to

award attorney

applicable legal standards and abused

costs against

The

trial

which attorney

fees

is

discretion.

basis: joint

and several

liability.

award 0f attorney

fees

and

After addressing the speciﬁc claims for

were being awarded and the statutory bases for the award 0f attorney

all

is

fees,

a classic case for joint and several liability.” R. 2316. The

trial

Defendants “acted concurrently to cause harm to Tricore” and “the harm

indivisible.” Id.

There are several obvious problems With the

and several

With

Brinkmeyer.

court held that “[t]his

court reasoned that

caused

fees, the trial court failed to act consistently

court also seemingly awarded attorney fees and costs against Stockton and

Brinkmeyer on another

trial

conspiracy t0 breach a contract.

civil

Joint and several liability cannot support the

B.

the

its

for an award.

liability is

a concept 0f tort, arising

concurrently cause an injury.” Tucker
156, 166 (1979); Idaho

Code

v.

trial

“when

court’s ruling. First,

by

statute, joint

tortious acts 0f several parties

Union Oil C0. 0fCal., 100 Idaho 590, 600, 603 P.2d

§ 6-803(3), (5). It is

not a concept that arises from a breach of a

contract 0r a statutory Violation. See Saint Alphonsus Diversiﬁed Care, Inc.

v.

MRI Assocs.,

157 Idaho 106, 123, 334 P.3d 780, 797 (2014) (“The legislature could have included

based upon breach 0f contract, but

Warren Estate was

it

did not do $0.”). Because the

liable t0 Tricore in tort,

court did not

liability

ﬁnd the

Brinkmeyer could not have acted concurrently

with the Warren Estate to cause an injury. See

Ins. Assocs.
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trial

Corp, 116 Idaho

at

LLP,

in tort

953, 782 P.2d at

1235. Joint and several liability simply does not apply.

Second, attorney fees are not normally awarded for

tort claims,

such as claims 0f tortious

interference. See, e.g., Bybee, 145 Idaho at 260, 178 P.3d at

625 (holding tortious interference

with contract and economic prospective advantage are

torts,

not actions t0 recover 0n a contract,

and are not a basis for attorney fees under Idaho Code

§ 12-120(3)).

That

is

perhaps

Why n0

reported case in Idaho has found joint and severally liable tortfeasors mutually liable for attorney

fees

the

and

trial

IV.

costs.

Again, because there

court abused

its

is

n0 valid basis

for the

award of attorney

fees t0 Tricore,

discretion.

The
to

trial court abused its discretion in adding $362,069.61 t0 the supersedeas bond
compensate Tricore for the loss of use 0f the property during appeal.

Brinkmeyer does not contest the

trial

court’s

ﬁnding

that

an order preserving and

maintaining the property during the appeal and a supersedeas bond in the amount 0f $672,426.31

was necessary

to stay the

judgment. See R. 2434-36; I.A.R. 13(b). But the

trial

court also ordered

Defendants to post a bond in the additional amount of $362,069.61 “[t]o compensate Tricore for
the lost opportunity t0 develop the property while the matter

was

error.

The

trial

is

being appealed.” R. 2435. That

court acted outside the boundaries of its discretion, inconsistent with the

governing standards, and without reason.

The

trial

court’s assumption that Tricore

was

entitled to “lost opportunity”

does not align With the Court’s rules that govern the stay ofjudgments or the

ﬁndings 0n Tricore’s loss 0f use damages during the court
discretion t0 stay the enforcement 0f the

While the

trial

court’s

own

court has the

judgment upon appropriate security and conditions, the
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trial.

trial

compensation

purpose of such security and conditions
13(b)(8), (10), (14), (15). That

was

is

easily

the order of speciﬁc performance and the

the protection of the status quo. See generally I.A.R.

done here,

as the property itself is adequate security for

bond of $672,426.31

is

adequate security for the

attorney fee and cost award. See I.A.R. 13(b)(10), (15).

Appropriate conditions and security are not warranted t0 protect the judgment holder

from past or future damages 0r hypothetical

risks.

Yet

that is

What the

trial

court did, fashioning

compensation of $362,069.61 for Tricore’s “lost opportunity” using 18 months 0f interest

at the

post-judgment interest rate on the purchase price 0f $2.4 million, plus 136%. R. 2435. Not only
is

that

award not authorized by I.A.R.

During the appeal, Tricore
its

is

13(b),

it is

an unjustiﬁed and unreasonable windfall.

able t0 retain the $2.4 million purchase price, using that

money t0

beneﬁt. Moreover, land, as opposed t0 money, has n0 ability t0 accrue interest. Should the

property increase in value during the appeal, Tricore will beneﬁt again.

Moreover, the

During

trial,

trial

court’s

award of $362,069.61

is

not supported by the evidence.

Tricore sought $2.5 million for the loss of use of the property since October 2016.

See R. 2023. The

trial

court found that

stay of the judgment, Tricore relied

that Tricore should

“pulled out of thin air.” Id. In opposing the

on the same evidence

nearly $8.5 million to compensate for

deﬁes logical

demand t0 be

its

loss

to ask the trial court for a

bond 0f

of use of the property during the appeal. R. 2340.

be awarded loss 0f use damages post—judgment When

not prove those damages pre-judgment.

For

all

those reasons, the

trial

court abused

supersedeas bond 0f $362,069.61.
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its

discretion in setting an additional

it

could

It

CONCLUSION
For the reasons explained, the Court should reverse the judgment of the

trial

court and

order the entry ofjudgment in favor of Brinkmeyer 0n Tricore’s tortious interference with
contract and conspiracy claims based

the Court

ﬁnds remand

is

more

0n Stockton’s valid

appropriate,

it

should order the

standards governing those claims. In any event, there

Brinkmeyer, and the Court should reverse

DATED: March

6,

right 0f ﬁrst refusal. Alternatively, if

is

trial

no basis

to

court t0 properly apply the

afﬁrm the judgment against

it.

2020.
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